Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations.
4 Fig. 1 . Scale of enforcement of the Russian competition agency.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Antitrust Service
The scale of enforcement seems to be even higher if we keep in mind the very broad area of responsibilities of the Russian competition agency. In addition to antitrust provisions (prohibition of collusion and concerted practice, abuse of dominance, and ex-ante merger approval), FAS is responsible for public enforcement of the rules on unfair competition (about 1,000 cases annually), on restrictions of competition by public authorities (about 5,000 cases annually), on the control over public procurement, on the Law on Advertising, on sector-specific regulatory provisions in such different industries as electricity and retailing, and on the approval of foreign investments in strategic companies.
The large scale of enforcement in cases of antitrust threatens the quality of the decisions made. The application of the antitrust legislation requires deep economic analysis in every case.
The excessive number of cases to be decided by competition authorities suggests insufficient efforts in the interpretation of the evidence available and therefore high probabilities of legal errors (wrongful convictions, or Type I errors and wrongful acquittals, or Type II errors). In turn, high probabilities of legal errors limit the effectiveness of the enforcement in terms of the deterrence effect.
We cannot present direct evidence of the efficiency of antitrust enforcement in Russia.
But expert estimates, as well as a general assessment of the investment climate in Russia, and even surveys of enterprises [Tsukhlo, 2012] suggest that competitive pressure ceased to grow over the past years. Survey result seems to be all the more strange if we keep in mind that antitrust enforcement in Russia has only recently become potentially effective -from 2007-2008. Before this, the very low level of fines (about 500,000 roubles, which is less than 15,000 euros at most) made market participants non-sensitive to the threat of antitrust investigations and conviction decisions from the competition agency. Only after the introduction of turnover However, all these features are only symptoms of the disease, but not the causes. There are different explanations of the non-satisfactory state of affairs in Russian competition policy, but as we see it, none of them are sufficient. First is that decisions of FAS are inspired by political reasons. It is not a mystery that many high-profiled cases on the violations of antitrust law were opened under direct orders of the prime minister and/or president of the Russian Federation. One recent example is the case against the 'Big Four' domestic oil companies -LUKOIL, Rosneft, TNK BP, and Gazprom Neft ]. Yet political order cannot explain the more than 3,000 decisions on the abuse of dominance annually. Moreover, FAS is guided by pure political agreements to a lesser extent than many other authorities in Russia, partially because of the very special position of executive power in the Russian system.
FAS initiates cases against federal and regional authorities for restrictions of competition, there are 3,000-5,000 cases under these specific provisions of the Russian competition law annually.
The opposition of FAS for many actions of regional government and federal authorities, as well as the extensive experience of legislative initiatives aimed at changes in regulation does not provide complete independence, but at least limits the possibilities of direct lobbying by both public executives and companies.
A second possible explanation of the limited deterrence is the point that rent extraction and coercion over business [Gans-Morse, 2012 ] is the objective of enforcement, as opposed to deterrence. However, evidence does not provide strong support for this explanation. The FAS is accused of corruption much less than many other executive authorities, and there is not any evidence of antitrust investigations being opened or closed for reason of corruption. An indirect 6 but important indicator of the fact that the activity of FAS is not driven by corruption is information openness of the authority and its decisions, which is not common for Russian executive authorities.
A third possible explanation for the limited effects of antitrust enforcement is the low qualification of officers in the competition agency. However, we consider this explanation to be not generally valid.  excessive scale of enforcement in terms of cases investigated;
 low level of deterrence;
 selection of cases for investigation not related to the restriction of competition;
 weak economic analysis and, as a consequence, large number of enforcement errors.
In the heart of the explanation presented are the incentives created for officers in the competition authority, companies in the market, and potential law violators by the national rules of administrative regulations. These rules make refusal to open investigation on the complaint relatively risky for the officer in the executive authority. General administrative rules to proceed with complaints registered were designed for control and supervision in the areas where evidence of non-compliance are relatively easy to detect. When these rules are extended over antitrust, they induce an enormous number of complaints by market participants, decreasing resources dedicated for every investigation, and distort the structure of investigations towards cases with high individual harm at stake (in contrast to social welfare loss), causing an increase in the probabilities of both Type I and Type II errors and reduce deterrence effects. Giving priority to complaints as a reason to initiate investigation, Russian competition enforcement combines the weaknesses of both public and private models of enforcement.
In contrast to many papers devoted to the weaknesses and adverse effects of law enforcement in Russia [see, for instance, Gans-Morse, 2012], we show that the structure of incentives in decision-making is sufficient to explain the relatively poor results of law enforcement, without taking into consideration corruption or the low level of skills of officers in the executive branch.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a brief review of the comparative advantage of public and private enforcement and a discussion of the nature of public enforcement in the Russian competition agency. Section 3 explains administrative rules regulating antitrust enforcement in Russian and develops a theoretical framework explaining the errors under a specific model of public enforcement (we called it reactive public enforcement hereafter in the text) and argue that most types of enforcement errors by the Russian competition agency are made in favour of the authors of the complaints, including law-abusing complaints.
Section 4 provides analysis of enforcement statistics of the FAS and its regional subdivision that support the framework developed. Section 5 discusses the reverse impact of the enforcement model on the development of Russian competition law. The main findings are reiterated in the conclusion.
Causes and effects of wrongful convictions under private and public antitrust enforcement
The literature on public versus private enforcement starts with Becker and Stigler [Becker, Stigler, 1974] , who argue that private enforcement could achieve deterrence as efficiently as optimal public enforcement. The general conclusion of the discussion is that both private and public enforcement can exhibit comparative advantages in different settings [Polinsky, 1980; Polinsky, Shavell, 2000] .
However, in our opinion, from the perspective of comparative law, the literature on private and public enforcement misses one important aspect, namely the artificial limitation placed on the models of enforcement under comparison. However, there is a widespread view that private enforcement exhibits significant drawbacks in comparison to public enforcement because of the specific sources of Type I errors, or over-enforcement [Rajabiun, 2012] . There are at least two sources of over-enforcement. The Attention to Type I errors (wrongful convictions) in antitrust litigation is explained by the effects of enforcement errors, which may be extremely strong for several reasons. In addition to the ethical cost of wrongful conviction, an additional direct cost imposed on the person convicted, and lower deterrence [Garoupa, Rizzoli, 2012] , wrongful convictions in antitrust enforcement imply that welfare-improving practices are considered illegal, narrowing the business opportunities and probably suppressing an upgrade. The negative impact of the ban on welfare-improving practices could be very high.
In this framework, the determinants of enforcement errors are important. The probability of enforcement errors may be considered as exogenous as a result of limited cognitive ability.
However, they could be considered as endogenous, explained, for instance, by the standards of evidence [Rizzoli, Saraceno, 2011] . The specific approach of this paper implies focusing on how the probability of Type I errors depends on the enforcement model. Another important difference between our framework and the existing literature is an explanation of the origin of enforcement errors, taking into consideration mistakes of executive authority, and the related conclusion on the interplay between the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors. Errors are endogenous, and they are predicted simply by exogenous budget constraints of authorities responsible for control and supervision. An assumption of the exogenous budget allocated between investigation and prosecution cases (which are predicted by the independent choices of victims, be they actual or alleged) corresponds well to the reality of civil law that is enforced by public control. One important outcome of this assumption is that the main prediction of both Type I and Type II error probabilities is the number of complaints. An increasing pressure of complaints causes an increase of both types of errors and a corresponding lowering of deterrence effects under the given legal rules and prescribed standards of evidence. Moreover, in this setting the increase of penalties may provide just the opposite effect to the one expected: expected gains from filing a complaint will increase, the number of complaints and cases under investigation will increase, as will the probability of errors, but the deterrence effect will decrease. About 1,500 warnings and precautions were issued in 2012 alone, and they contain conditions that could be considered as 'soft remedies', such as instructions to sign a contract with a specific partner, apply a specific type of contract for a specific party, to provide good or service on a nondiscriminatory basis, and so forth.
Reactive Model of Public Enforcement as a Source of Enforcement

Errors
The credibility of sanctions against managers of a company as physical persons is also Since competition authorities cannot distinguish between 'honest' and 'law abusing' complainants, and considering the high penalties, antitrust proceedings can become an efficient tool for blackmailing. The high probability of a wrongful conviction distorts the deterrence effect, decreasing the expected gains under legal behaviour. Moreover, the efforts of competition authorities are skewed towards investigations opened by complaints in contrast to investigations on cases opened by the FAS on its own initiative, and this has resulted in an increased probability of Type II errors (under-enforcement of law versus restrictions on competition). In this way the system of antitrust enforcement becomes socially expensive and simultaneously provides a very limited deterrence effect. Expensive enforcement involves an excessive number of investigations, which are performed with limited standards of economic analysis. A conceptual framework that explains the unsatisfactory outcomes of the legal protection of competition in Russia is provided in the next section and is based on the negative dependence of the probability of enforcement errors on the resources dedicated for one investigation.
Incentives of the parties in the enforcement of antitrust legislation
In this section we briefly describe the framework in which we explain enforcement errors in 'reactive' enforcement as a special type of public enforcement. The probability of wrongful conviction increases because of two reasons, which can be separated for 'genuine', or 'non-abusing', and 'abusing' complainants.
The first group of complaints is inspired by a desire to change the business practices of the offender. Even a 'genuine' complainant, however, cannot assess if his complaint is reasonable in the sense that there is specifically an antitrust violation. But in any case, the assumption of the complainant that a violation has occurred is based on the overestimation of individual effects in comparison with social welfare. The second group of complaints is inspired by the intention to induce an additional cost on the offender. The complainant presumably knows that there is no antitrust violation but expects that there is a probability of wrongful conviction by the competition authority.
Complainants. Both groups of complainants make a decision to file a complaint by comparing the expected gains with the cost of filing. The cost of filing can be considered as minor. Expected gains differ: For the first group, these are gains from the offender changing its business practices, while the second group expects gains from the wrongful conviction of an alleged offender. The number of complaints from the first group generally increases with a decrease in deterrence, while the number of complaints in the second group increases with the growing probability of Type I errors.
Potential Violator. A potential offender makes the decision to follow or to violate antitrust rules by comparing gains from two options [Becker, 1968] . An increase in the probability of a wrongful conviction decreases the gains from behaving legally. An increase in the probability of a wrongful acquittal increases the gains from violations. Therefore, increasing the number of complaints and decreasing the resources per investigation, correspondingly increases the number of wrongful decisions that distort deterrence.
The logic of interaction between the main actors in the model of 'reactive' public enforcement is presented in Fig. 2 . Both non-abusing and abusing complaints increase the number of investigations and shift the structure of investigation by the competition authority towards cases on 'exploitation' in contrast to 'competition restrictions', with the latter increases the probability of Type I enforcement errors. The growing number of investigations decreases the resources available for any one investigation, and decreasing resources increases the probability of both types of enforcement errors. Type I enforcement errors make abusing complaints more profitable, but both types of errors lower deterrence. As a result law violations become more probable, creating the causes for (non-abusing) complaints. Finally, the involvement of appeal and cassation instances in the resolution of cases of antitrust law violations is also very high. The ratio of decisions reversed by the higher instance steadily decreased from the first instance to cassation, but remains to be at least moderate.
However, the statistics of appellation and cassation instances tells us substantially less about the probability of being wrongfully convicted, since filings in higher instances are almost equally distributed between convicted companies (which seek to appeal a decision by competition authorities in the highest court) and competition authorities trying to reverse acquittals by the courts of the first instance.
Statistics of the enforcement of the 82 regional subdivisions by FAS (Tab. 2) also support the hypothesis on the decisive impact of complaints on the structure of enforcing Russian competition law. In spite of the big differences between regional subdivisions, there is a common trend. Until 2011 the number of investigations and convictions follows the increase of complaints registered. In 2012 this trend changed, presumably because of the introduction of warnings and precautions that partially replaced investigations on specific cases. 5 It should be noted that not only convictions but also decisions on non-violations are registered in the statistics of commercial courts. However, appeals on conviction decisions are at least 90-95% of the overall appeals. The second feature of the commercial court statistics that complicates interpretation of the data officially reported is that not only appeals to decisions on the law 'On the Protection of Competition' but also to the decisions on other laws, including the Laws on Advertising, on Public Procurement and on Trade. According to expert estimates, however, decisions within the law 'On the Protection of Competition' accounts for at least 2/3 of all decisions. The reason for this is much the higher level of penalties for violations of the Law on Competition. Source: Federal Antitrust Service, data for regional subdivisions.
Empirical hypotheses and results
A comparison of the data on regional competition authorities allows us to test three hypotheses related to the conceptual framework presented above:
H1. The number of investigations increases if the number of complaints increases
In spite of the fact that this proposition seems evident from the descriptive statistics at both national and regional levels of competition regulation, the causal link between the number of complaints registered and investigations opened may be questioned. Confirmation of H1
would support the main element of the explanations of the features and results of Russian antitrust enforcement, and that this activity of the agency is driven by the individual interests of the complainants. Alternative hypothesis is that number of investigation is explained by the economic welfare and structure of gross regional product in terms of groups of industries. In this type of analysis we also should divide investigations opened by the own initiative of competition agency and investigations with the reference on the complaints registered. We do that using variable that indicates the share of investigations opened by the own initiatives of regional competition agency. In the framework developed above, the increasing share of convictions with the number of investigations contributes to the explanation of links between excessive enforcement and a low deterrence effect. Even under the given proportion of wrongful convictions in the decisions of the competition authority, the probability of being wrongfully convicted increases with the number of investigations. Increasing the number of investigations opened decreases the deterrence effect in this case. The descriptive statistics (Fig. 4) do not provide an unambiguous conclusion on the link between the number of investigations and the share of convictions in the decisions of the FAS.
Thus, deeper analysis is necessary.
H3. The higher is the number of guilty decisions made by competition authorities, the higher the number of complaints submitted to the authority in the next year
Third hypothesis is not directly predicted by descriptive statistics. However, it is important in the developed conceptual framework. To file a complaint, a market participant should know that the probability to that the accused party will be punished is high enough. This is crucial both for non-abusive and abusive complainants. In turn, the expected probability depends on the scale of enforcement (the higher the number of investigations, the higher the expected probability that the competition authority will open an investigation based on a given complaint) and the ratio of convictions to decisions on investigation (the higher the probability that after the investigation the party will be punished, the higher the expected probability of punishment on the given complaint). We suppose that, in contrast to the link between complaints and investigations, there is a time lag in the influence of the scale of enforcement on the incentive to complaint.
Therefore the hypothesis tested is divided into two parts:
H3.1. The higher the number of investigations opened by the competition authority in year t-1, the higher the number of complaints that will be filled in year t.
H3.2. The higher the ratio of convictions to investigations opened in year t-1, the higher
the number of complaints that will be filled in year t.
All the hypotheses are tested using panel data analysis. The choice between fixed and random effects regressions is made following Hausman test.
Tab. 3 and 4 present the results of testing for the first hypothesis. The results imply significant contribution of complaints to the overall number of investigations performed by Russian competition authorities. In the framework developed, complaints increase the probability of being punished for actions that provide high individual effects. A wrongful conviction can be punishment for the actions that do not restrict competition (when illegal activity implies restriction of competition) or for actions whose positive effects exceed its negative ones (when illegal activity implies prohibition of harm without the need to prove restrictions on competition).
Wrongful convictions, in turn, distort the deterrence effect in several ways. The first one is the increase of the probability to punish the innocent, decreasing the expected gain from nonviolation of the law. The second one is a further distortion of the standards of economic analysis and presenting the evidence in antitrust cases. In this sense, one wrongful conviction in a system with a short tradition of enforcing competition law can contribute to the escalation of erroneous decisions.
FAS: 2008-2012 *(Fixed Effects Regression)
Dependent Variable =Number of investigations opened (in logarithms) in year t 
Notes:
COMPLAINTS -number of the complaints filled in the regional subdivision GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT -deflated to 2007 prices, with one year lag MANUFACTURING -share of manufacturing in Gross Regional Product, with one year lag All regressions incorporate regional dummy variables.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
CONVICTIONS -share of convictions in the decisions of competition agencies
All regressions incorporate regional dummy variables ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
However, data generally fit the impression that there are complaints that support the increase of the scale of enforcement as a 'self-sustaining' process. Consider competing interpretations. Can the widespread restrictions of competition in Russian markets themselves be the cause of the increase of complaints? It is doubtful, because the number of complaints and antitrust investigations opened on complaints began to grow only after the introduction of turnover penalties, which is after a sharp increase of standards of penalties. This means that complainants take into account the possible punishment on the party accused in violation. So these are the incentives of the complainants that explain the growing antitrust enforcement. In this respect, data on investigations and convictions of the regional subdivisions support the conceptual framework developed. However, we cannot empirically distinguish the impact of penalties and rules of enforcement on the incentives of non-abusing and abusing complainants.
Expected punishment is important for both types to make a decision to complain. We only can mention that descriptive statistics on the appeals and successful appeals to the decision of antitrust authorities in commercial courts support the hypothesis at least on the large and increasing number of wrongful convictions in the decisions of antitrust authorities. In turn, we cannot divide the impact of the authority's scarce resources and of abusive complaints on the ratio of Type I errors, as this requires additional statistics that are currently not available. 'asymmetry' of price dynamics: when prices in external markets increase, the domestic price increases at the same rate, when prices fall in external markets, domestic price fall at lower rate.
It is difficult to assess the ratio of the cases on 'high monopolistic price', where Type I errors were made, but the criteria applied the guarantee that this ratio is very high. As of late the competition agency is considering working with our 'criteria of fair prices assessment', which 30 uses a comparison of domestic prices with prices in world markets as a possible solution to the problem. Not discussing the correspondence of this rule to the 'correct' concept of high monopolistic price, which is doubtful as every attempt to define excessive price [see Evans, Padilla, 2005] , we should only mention that the application of such a rule restores a kind of price regulation with many negative externalities hardly predictable in every given market.
Discrimination is a typical reason for complaining, according to Russian competition law.
In cases involving discrimination, which annually number in the several hundreds, the FAS tends to consider the pure variation of contract terms for different buyers and suppliers as discrimination [Avdasheva, Shastitko, 2012] . Another occasion to complain about discrimination is any reason to refuse to contract a counterparty that is contracting another one. Most convictions contain at least some elements of Type I errors. During the last four years there have been heated discussions among competition authorities, lawyers, and economists on the 'justified' reasons for contract term variations and for selection of a counterparty. For now, the approach suggested by competition authorities for companies is to elaborate formalized 'trade practices' or 'trade policies' as a document that should contain a complete set of criteria for the eligibility of business partners, procedures for signing contracts, and choosing contract terms, including price variation as well as conflict resolution. Not discussing the comparative advantages of this approach, we should at least mention that it imposes an additional burden on many sellers and buyers and is capable of unduly restricting applied business practices.
In both cases, the subjects of discussions seem very strange for international experts in competition law. Prosecution for 'highly monopolistic' (in terms of European competition law -'excessive') prices or for discrimination (especially outside regulated industries) are very rare in most jurisdictions, and even if they attract a lot of attention by economists and lawyers, the probability of being accused of this practice is very low for almost every company. It is not the case in Russia, however. One possible explanation is not only underdeveloped competition in the Russian market, which gives 'extra' market power for most sellers. An important explanation is that every variation of contract terms among counterparties (for instance, quantity discounts) creates a disadvantage for somebody (in contrast to purely uniform contract terms), and therefore induces incentives to complain.
Another dark side of this trajectory of competition law and practice improvement is that the most important problems of competition protection -protection from collusion and entry prevention -are evidently underestimated. In contrast to 'exploitative' practice when gains of certain market participants are at stake, entry prevention affects those who have an option just not to enter the market.
In summation, patterns of 'reactive' enforcement of competition law are not neutral for the development of legislation. Both substantive and procedural rules are affected by a desire to limit the scope of wrongful convictions, as well as the cost of wrongful convictions for parties.
However, both types of changes provide an ambiguous effect on deterrence. Changes and amendments of substantive rules in Russian competition law are concentrated around 'exploitative' practices (first of all within the scope of Article 10, which regards the abuse of dominance), since wrongful convictions in the application of these rules affect a higher share of market participants. This track of changes inevitably diverts attention from the main objective of antitrust enforcement that is preventing restrictions of competition. In turn, the desire to limit the severity of punishment in order to reduce the cost of wrongful convictions inspires changes in procedural rules, which decrease the deterrence effect for violations.
Following the framework developed, we can conclude that the purpose of many recent amendments to Russian competition law would be achieved not by changing legal rules, but by changing the criteria of assessing the effects of antitrust enforcement. Applying criteria for the impact on total welfare -even imprecise and incomplete -would prevent the competition agency from opening many investigations where only individual effects are at stake. Priority should be given to the part of procedural rules that determines the incentives of enforcers, in contrast to describing illegal actions and norms for punishment. This paper also highlights the importance of effect-based public enforcement, and of the impact that incentives for the regulating agency have on the outcomes of enforcement, as well as on the motivation of market participants. Generally, the fruitful idea of involving market participants in the absence of motivation for the competition agency on the welfare effect of enforcement can degenerate easily, especially in countries with weak traditions of enforcing competition law. Distorted incentives lead to over-enforcement and lower deterrence, even with non-corrupt and high-skilled officers in the agency.
Conclusions
